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1. Introduction 
Since the work of Bain (1956) and Sylos-Labini (1962), the problem of entry has 
received a great deal of attention. Early attempts to uncover the effects of entry include 
for instance Frank (1965), Okuguchi (1973) and Ruffin (1971). In an influential paper, 
Seade (1980) provides a fairly general analysis of entry in an oligopolistic market. He 
shows that while entry may increase or reduce the outputs of the incumbents, it always 
reduces their profits. These results are based on two important assumptions. First, he 
assumes that the pre and the post entry product markets are characterized by Cournot 
competition. However, as shown in Spence (1977), Dixit (1980) and many others, 
while facing the threat of entry, the incumbents often adopt pre-commitment 
strategies, which allow them to behave like Stackelberg leaders in the product market. 
Hence, it is quite reasonable to consider the post-entry market to be characterized by 
Stackelberg competition between the incumbents and the entrants, as in Spulber 
(1981) and Basu and Singh (1990). Second, Seade (1980) assumes that all firms are 
symmetric in terms of production costs. However, cost asymmetry rather than 
symmetry is perhaps the empirical regularity. 
In the present paper we relax the two above-mentioned assumptions and 
analyze the effects of entry on outputs and profits. More specifically, we show that if 
the firms differ in production cost, and the pre and post entry product markets are 
characterized by Cournot and Stackelberg competition respectively, entry always 
increases the outputs of the cost efficient incumbents, while it may or may not increase 
the outputs of the cost inefficient incumbents. We also find that entry may increase the 
profits of the relatively cost efficient incumbents. This happens when the following 
three factors are ‘large’: the number of the cost inefficient incumbents relative to the 
cost efficient incumbents and the entrants, the cost difference between the incumbents,   2
and the costs of the entrants. All these factors help to strengthen the output raising 
effect of entry under Stackelberg competition while weakening the competition effect. 
However, entry always reduces the profits of the cost inefficient incumbents. These 
results suggest that the cost efficient incumbents may actually encourage new entry in 
the industry. 
  It is important to note that, unlike Seade (1980), where the output raising effect 
of entry is due to a sufficiently convex demand function, in our analysis this effect is 
attributable to Stackelberg competition. Stackelberg leadership induces the incumbents 
to increase their outputs in order to reduce the market share of the entrants. But the 
incentive for business stealing is stronger for the cost efficient incumbents relative to 
the inefficient ones. As a result, entry always increases the outputs of the former firms.  
However, the output changes of the cost inefficient firms are ambiguous. On 
one hand, Stackelberg leadership under entry tends to increase their outputs compared 
to the situation of Cournot competition under no entry. On the other hand, since the 
incumbent firms among themselves behave like Cournot oligopolits even under entry, 
the output expansion of the cost efficient incumbents tends to reduce the outputs of the 
cost inefficient incumbents. Hence, whether entry increases the outputs of the cost 
inefficient firms depends on the relative strengths of these opposing effects. 
   This paper can be related to a recent literature, which shows that entry may 
increase profits of the incumbents in a vertical structure. Tyagi (1999) and Naylor 
(2002) respectively find that depending on the market demand curve and the 
preference of the upstream agents over input price and quantity, entry of a new 
downstream firm may increase profits of the downstream incumbents. Mukherjee et al. 
(2007) show that irrespective of the centralized or decentralized upstream market 
structure, a downstream monopolist has the incentive to create competition through   3
licensing in the downstream market. Higher competition in the downstream market 
can create a positive effect on the incumbent’s profits by reducing the input prices. 
  Our results do not depend on a vertical structure, and entry does not create any 
strategic advantage in the input market. The key that drives our results is the cost 
differences between the firms and the Stackelberg leadership of the incumbents vis-à-
vis the entrants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and shows the results. Section 3 concludes.  
 
2. The model and the results 
2.1. The case of no entry  
Consider  n m +   incumbent firms producing a homogenous product. The constant 
marginal cost of production for each of the m  firms is  m c , which is set to be zero for 
simplicity. The constant marginal cost of each of the n  firms is  0 ≥ n c . Hence,  n c  
measures the cost difference between the cost efficient and the cost inefficient 
incumbents. The firms compete in the Cournot fashion. 
  We assume that the inverse market demand function for the product is  
q a P − = ,           ( 1 )  
where the notations have usual meanings. Each of the m and  n firms respectively 
maximizes the following expression to determine its output: 
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For all firms to produce positive outputs, we need 
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which is assumed to hold. 
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2.2. The case of entry 
Let us now introduce entry. We assume that there are k   entrants, each with the 
constant marginal cost  ) ( n c e ≥ . Such entry could arise due to either exogenous 
knowledge spillover, or patent expiry of an old technology of the incumbents.  
Recalling Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980), it may then be reasonable to 
consider the incumbents as dominant firms and the entrants as Stackelberg followers. 
We examine the following game. At stage 1, the  n m+  incumbent firms choose their 
outputs simultaneously. At stage 2, k  entrants determine their outputs simultaneously. 
Then the profits are realized. We solve the game by backward induction. 
  Given the outputs of the incumbents, the tth entrant maximizes: 
  t
q
q e q a Max
t
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where  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  t j i ≠ ≠ , and each of the n incumbent firms  maximizes: 







i q q c
k
q q e a k













∑ ∑ ,               (8b) 
where  n j ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  t j i ≠ ≠ . 
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Substituting (9a) and (9b) into (7) to obtain an entrant’s equilibrium output 
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We assume that 
0 > t q ,  i.e.,  e
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Otherwise, entry has no meaning in our analysis. If (11) holds, the outputs of the 
incumbents are positive since  0 ≥ ≥ n c e  by assumption. Note that, since  n c e ≥ , we   6
have  n c e ≥  if 




cn . In other words, if 




cn , we obtain  0 = t q  
for any  n c e ≥ . Hence, for entry to be meaningful given  n c e ≥ , we restrict our 
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  The equilibrium profit for each of the m and n incumbent firms is respectively 
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Proposition 1: (i) The equilibrium output of each cost efficient incumbent is always 
higher under entry than under no entry. 
(ii) The equilibrium output of each cost inefficient incumbent is higher under entry 
than under no entry if  ) ), 1 ( ( e m c e n + ∈  and 
)
) 1 ( ) 1 ) )( 1 )(( 1 (
, 0 [
+ − + + + +
∈
k n n m k m
a
cn . 
Proof: (i) Straightforward from (9a) and (3a). 
(ii) We get that (3b) < (9b) if 
e m cn < + ) 1 ( .           ( 1 4 )  
Since  ) , [ e c e n ∈ , condition (14) holds if  ) 1 ( + > m c e n  or 
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Figures 1(a, b) help us to understand Proposition 1. 
Figures 1 (a, b) 
Given the symmetry within the cost efficient and the cost inefficient incumbents, we 
draw the reaction functions of a typical cost efficient incumbent, say firm i, and a 
typical cost inefficient incumbent, say firm j, under no entry and under entry. AA and 
















j  respectively.  CC and DD are the reaction 
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functions of both firms lie outward with entry, which is ensured given our restrictions 










We find from the reaction functions of firm i that, for a given  j q , the increase 







R q q i j i , where  i R  stands for 
the reaction functions of firm i . The reaction functions of firm  j show that to 
maintain the same amount of  j q  under both entry and no entry, we need to increase 
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functions of firm j. It is easy to show that  ) / ( ) / ( j j i i j i R q q R q q Δ
<
≥
Δ  for   8
e m cn <
≥
+ ) 1 ( . Hence, for a given  j q , entry shifts firm i’s reaction function more (less) 
than firm j’s reaction function if  e m cn ) ( ) 1 ( < > + . Therefore, if  e m cn > + ) 1 (,  e n t r y  
increases the output of firm i but reduces that of firm j, which is depicted in Figure 
1(a). 
  On the other hand, if  e m cn < + ) 1 ( , entry increases the output of firm j. But, 
given the negatively sloped reaction functions, it is not immediate whether the output 
of firm i increases. We can show that for a given  i q , the increase in  j q  under entry 
compared to no entry is higher in reaction function  i R  than  in  j R , i.e., 
) / ( ) / ( i i j j i j R q q R q q Δ < Δ . Hence, entry increases the output of firm i even for 
e m cn < + ) 1 ( . Figure 1(b) represents this situation. 
  Intuitively, entry creates two effects on the output behavior of the incumbents. 
First, it encourages all the incumbents to increase their outputs in order to steal market 
shares from the entrants, which is reflected by the outward shifts of the incumbents’ 
reaction functions. Second, since the incumbents compete like Cournot oligopolists, 
an output change of one incumbent affects the output decision of other incumbents 
due to strategic interactions, which determines the final equilibrium outputs on the 
new reaction functions. Since the marginal gains are higher for the cost efficient 
incumbents than the cost inefficient ones, the incentives for increasing outputs are 
higher to the former firms than the latter, and we find that entry always increases the 
outputs of the cost efficient incumbents.  
Therefore, there are two opposing effects of entry on the cost inefficient 
incumbents. On one hand, the Stackelberg leadership effect tends to increase the 
outputs of all incumbents, but on the other hand, the output expansion of the cost 
efficient incumbents tends to reduce the outputs of the cost inefficient incumbents. If   9
the costs of the entrants are sufficiently high, which help to strengthen the former 
effect, and the cost difference between the incumbents is sufficiently small, which 
helps to weaken the latter effect, entry increases the outputs of the cost inefficient 
incumbents compared to no entry. 
  
Proposition 2: (i) Only if  1 1− + > k m n , the profit of each of the m  incumbents 
(which are cost efficient) is higher under entry than under no entry for 
) 1 1 ( 1
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(ii) The profit of each of the n incumbents (which are cost inefficient) is lower under 
entry than under no entry. 
Proof: (i) We get that (12a) > (5a) if 
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Therefore, (17) is a necessary condition for (16) to hold, but not sufficient, since 
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Hence, entry increases the profits of the cost efficient incumbents if (16), (17) and (18) 
all hold. 
    If (17) does not hold, we obtain  )






c e e n
c , and the profits of the 
cost efficient incumbents are always lower under entry than under no entry. 
(ii) We have (5b) > (12b) if 
  e
k
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,     (19) 
which holds for any  ) , [ e c e n ∈ .                             Q.E.D. 
 
The intuition for the above result is as follows. While entry creates higher 
competition, it also induces the cost efficient incumbent firms to increase their outputs 
compared to no entry. When the number of cost inefficient incumbents relative to the 
cost inefficient ones and the entrants, the cost difference between the incumbents and 
the costs of the entrants are all sufficiently large, the output raising effect of entry 
outweighs the competition effect, resulting in higher profits of the cost efficient 
incumbents under entry than under no entry. 
Figures 2 (a, b) portray the effects of entry on the profits of the cost efficient 
incumbents. 
Figures 2(a, b) here 
The lines EE, 0F and GG depict the relationship 
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> ,  n c e ≥  and  e e < . Hence, entry increases the profits   11
of the cost efficient incumbents in the shaded area. Figure 2(b) considers the case of 
1 1− + < k m n , and shows that 
k
k nc a k
e
n ) 1 )( 1 1 ( + − − +
>   is not satisfied in 
) , [ e c e n ∈ . In this situation, entry always reduces the profits of the incumbents. 
  However, entry always reduces the profits of the cost inefficient firms, even if 
their output might rise, because the negative effects of higher competition and output 
expansion by the cost efficient incumbents always dominate the output effects for the 
cost inefficient incumbents.  
 
3. Conclusion 
It is generally believed that entry of new firms reduces profits of the incumbent firms. 
We show that this may not be the case if the incumbents differ in marginal costs of 
production, and the incumbents and the entrants behave like Stackelberg leaders and 
followers. 
  We show that when the relative number of cost inefficient incumbents is large 
enough, the cost efficient incumbents earn higher profits under entry than under no 
entry if the cost difference between the incumbents and the costs of the entrants are 
above certain levels. However, the cost inefficient incumbents always earn lower 
profits under entry than under no entry. While entry always increases the outputs of 
the cost efficient incumbents, its effect on the outputs of the cost inefficient 
incumbents is ambiguous. 
Though we assume an exogenously given Stackelberg leader-follower structure 
under entry, as already mentioned, it may arise endogenously if the incumbent firms 
have the option to pre-commit to their capacity levels (Spence, 1979 and Dixit, 1980). 
Obviously, the purpose of this paper is to show the effects of entry in the simplest 
way, rather than explaining the evolution of the Stackelberg structure.    12
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Figure 2(a): Entry increases the profits of the cost efficient incumbents when 





Figure 2(b): Entry always reduces the profits of the incumbents when 
1 1− + < k m n . 
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